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T h a t  there has been a dramatic increase in grant 43 
litigation over the past decade is a proposition 
which is not disputed, and a subject which has been 
treated extensively in the legal literature and else- 
where? And it is fair to say, I think, that there has 
also arisen a certain uneasiness on the part of 
many students of the federal grant-in-aid system at  
the sudden arrival in force of lawyers on the scene. 
Realistically, nonlawyers must not only recog- 
nize the existence of this phenomenon, but also try 
to understand it. If anything, the need for under- 
standing is even greater on. the lawyers' side; 
lawyers and judges need to appreciate the dynam- 
ics of the grant system far better than they do at  
present. As exhibit A, one might cite the initial 
decision of the fifth circuit in Goolsby v. Blumen- 
thd2. Initially, a 2-to-1 panel ruled that Gen- 
eral Revenue Sharing funds were just like any 
other federal grant, and therefore the expendi- 
tures of them were subject to the Unijiomz Reloca- 
tion Assistance Act.' Now, if a court doesn't see 
the difference between revenue sharing on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, the categorical 
grants which dominated the system when the Relo- 
cation Act was enacted, we should not be surprised 
when it renders a questionable decision. What is 
needed is an ongoing dialogue-a bridge, if you 
will-between the lawyers and the experts in other 
disciplines who are working on grant isiues. The 
ACIR is in an ideal position to provide this bridge. 
Today's conference is, one hopes, an important 
first step. 
6 6 !Chose disputes which 
ultimately end up in court 
reflect political disputes in the 
society at large. 9 9  
The community development (CD) litigation is an 
interesting illustration of this point. Let me begin 
with a quote from an "Advocacy Guide" to the 
Community Development Block Grant Program 
put out by a major legal services group. 
Struggles over the use of CDBG funds do 
not simply involve interpretations of the 
HCDA, but are part of much broader con- 
flicts over the control and use of resources, 
and over broad public policy issues.* 
As the quote suggests, those disputes which uIti- 
44 mately end up in court reflect political disputes in 
the society at  large. As the volume of grant funds 
has expanded, and as Congress has utilized the 
grant mechanism to create a panoply of new in- 
terests, it is hardly surprising that the number of 
grant lawsuits has likewise increased. 
Before proceeding further I have to enter one 
disclaimer about any analysis of the CD cases. It is 
true that grant cases in general are hard to find in 
the published reports. This difficulty seems even 
greater in the CD area. Many of the cases are not 
reported officially, but are "semireported," that is, 
they can be found in the Clearinghouse Rewiew or 
some other unofficial s o u r ~ e . ~  Some of them are 
not reported anywhere but are passed on by word 
of mouth and memoranda among various networks 
in the CD field.6 
Despite the difficulties of getting a fix on the 
overall volume of CD litigation it is apparent that it 
is substantial. I base this statement on the 17 cases 
which I have found in the Federal Reporter and 
Federal Supplement, the large number of semire- 
ported cases, and the large number of settlements 
that one reads about in the literature. Others have 
reached the same conclusion. Writing in 1976, 
Prof. James Kushner stated that "more legal chal- 
lenges have been made in the first year of the 
HCDA than unde: the past decade of urban renew- 
al and categorical  grant^."^ More recently, the 
"Advocacy Guide" quoted earlier stated that 
"each year of the CDBG program has seen an in- 
creasing number of cases brought . . . 
Let us take this volume of cases as a given, and 
ask ourselves the reason why. Why does this par- 
ticular statute seem to engender so much litiga- 
tion? The answer, I think, is to be found in the 
structure of the act itself. It invites controversy. 
Specifically, it invites challenges on the part of 
those within the community whose proposals did 
not get funded. The key lies in the change from a 
number of categorical grant programs to a single 
block grant. As The Brookings Institution points 
out, the range of eligible activities helped bring 
new groups into competition, and forced generalist 
local government officials to make specific 
 choice^.^ Moreover, these choices. were highly visi- 
ble given the act's citizen participation mechanism. 
Competition for funds has been intense. The city 
manager of Cambridge, MA, testified during re- 
newal hearings about a program year in which he 
received $8 million worth of requests for $2.8 mil- 
lion in funds for which Cambridge was eligibleY 
The natural result of such a situation will be fierce 
struggle in the political arena, with an inevitable 
number of losers. As I suggested a moment ago, 
the typical American phenomenon will then ensue: 
people who have lost in that arena will transfer the 
battle to the judicial arena, in this case the federal 
court. 
With some exceptions courts tend to view the CD 
cases not as presenting unique questions of "grant 
law," but as forms of the administrative law litiga- 
tion to which they have become accustomed over 
the last half century. For example, the doctrine of 
scope of review is applied hterchangeably in both 
grant cases and the more typical regulatory con- 
text.12 In fact, the leading case on scope of re- 
view-Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
V~lpe~~-involved a third-party challenge to a 
transportation grant. I would like to focus on CD 
litigation of a particular sort; suits by third parties 
who claim that they should benefit under the act 
but do not receive the appropriate quantum of 
benefits under their community's application.14 
These suits are usually brought against HUD to en- 
join approval of the application. 
The doctrine which has cropped up most fre- 
quently in these cases has been that of stand- 
ing. Governmental defendents have consistently 
argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that is, 
that there was not a genuine adversary relation- 
ship between the would be challengers on the one 
hand and the defendant on the other hand. The fact 
that standing has arisen so frequently in this area 
of litigation is by no means unique. Prof. Richard 
Cappalli estimates that the issue surfaces in almost 
one-half of all grant cases.16 In the CD context, a t  
least, the party challenging standing almost 
always lases. l6 
The courts have, if anything, been somewhat un- 
critical in assuming that plaintiffs had suffered 
some harm and did stand to benefit if the court en- 
joined a community's application in its present 
form. An example is Philadelphia Weuare Rights 
Organization v. Embry17 a challenge to an applica- 
tion based on insufficient benefit to low income 
persons under that portion which financed housing 
rehabilitation. The court stated that "reallocation 
of Title I funds to benefit low income people will di- 
rectly result in an increase in the availability of 
housing units for low income people,"18 without 
considering whether any such reallocation would 
result from its decree. Unless they wish to abandon 
traditional standing inquiries, courts would seem 
to be under a duty to consider whether the plain- 
tiffs really will be any better off if they secure the 
relief which they seek. Perhaps their reluctance to 
engage in an extensive standing inquiry stems 
from a concern that strict application of Supreme 
Court cases such as Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Organization. l9 and Warth v. 
SeUinz0 would lead to conclusions that no one had 
standing to challenge CD  application^.^^ 
Of course, that inquiry can be exceedingly com- 
plex. Recently, minority residents of Boston sued 
HUD to enjoin the award of a UDAG grant to that 
city. They alleged that Boston did not meet the 
statutory criteria of having a demonstrable record 
of achievement in improving conditions for racial 
minor i t i e~ .~~ The district judge found that they 
lacked standing. He reasoned that if plaintiffs won, 
Boston would get nothing, and that, apart from 
spite, that result did not represent any benefit to 
them. The first circuit court of appeals rein- 
stated the complaint, a t  least temporarily, al- 
though it too found the standing issue extremely 
difficult.23 The court reasoned that some plain- 
tiffs had been harmed by discriminatory housing 
conditions in Boston, and that if the projects to be 
funded were administered in nondiscriminatory 
fashion, that might well help the plaintiffs by en- 
hancing their housing opp~rtuni t ies .~~ The princi- 
pal problem with this analysis is that very little of 
the project funds were to be allocated to housing, 
and what housing there was would not seem to 
help plaintiffs find low cost shelter in an integrated 
neighborhood.36 
The court might have found standing if it had 
been willing to take an expansive view of the statu- 
tory benefit analysis utilized in some cases? Con- 
gress might be viewed as having granted to plain- 
tiffs an interest in having UDAG funds awarded 
only to communities which had actively worked, or 
which would work, to increase opportunities for 
minorities. The harm suffered is, thus, not the pre- 
existing condition, but the award of funds in a 
manner which does nothing to alleviate it.27 
Perhaps the source of much of the first circuit's 
difficulty is its apparent agreement with the sec- 
ond circuit's decision in the famous, some would 
say notorious, Hai-tford l i t igati~n?~ In that case 
Hartford, and low income residents, sued in feder- 
al court to enjoin CD grants to a number of its 
suburbs on the bound that ' those communities 
were not correctly preparing the housing as- 
sistance plan which the act requires as a condition 
of receiving funds. In particular, Hartford asserted 45 
that they had failed to plan adequately for low and 
moderate income residents who might be "ex- 
pected to reside" within their borders. Ultimately, 
the challenge was rejected on the ground that both 
Hartford and the low income residents lacked 
standing to bring the action. A majority of the sec- 
ond circuit emphasized the fact that if the su- 
burbs conformed their plans to the act's require- 
ments, Hartford would therefore get nothing. 
What the court failed to appreciate however is that 
Congress had declared that planning by suburbs to 
alleviate the municipal overburden of center cities 
such as Hartford would, in effect, lead to better 
conditions both for those communities themselves 
and for low and moderate income residents who 
might wish to move to suburban locations. This 
reasoning was adopted in a Michigan federal dis- 
trict court opinion-Coalition for Block Grant 
Compliance v. HUD? That case relied on the sta- 
tutory benefit analysis, and rejected the Hartford 
rationale. 
I t  is possible that circumstances will arise in 
which third parties wish to sue the grantee direct- 
ly, rather than suing HUD. A somewhat extreme 
example of this configuration is Angell v. Zinsser.80 
In that case a group of residents are attempting to 
enjoin their town's withdrawal from the program. 
More frequent might be cases in which plaintiffs 
seek to enjoin expenditure of the funds until their 
own projects are included in the grantee's overall 
program. 
Such lawsuits are liable to bring the plaintiffs 
face to face with the doctrine of "implied rights of 
action" under federal statutes. ~ h $  issue-arises 
when a Congressional enactment creates a duty on 
the part of individuals (or governments) to be en- 
forced by a federal regulatory agency, but does not 
provide for suit by other individuals who may suf- 
fer harm as a result of a breach of that duty. The 
question then is posed whether a right af action- 
suit by such aggrieved individuals-can be derived 
or "implied" from the statute. Although the Su- 
preme Court has recently found in favor of a plain- 
tiff invoking the implied right of action doctrine in 
the grant contextY3l it has also suggested that it 
will utilize a much more restrictive approach in the 
future. 32 
As of this writing there is the additional possibili- 
ty that some grant suits of the nature under discus- 
sion can also be brought under Section 1983 of Ti- 
tle 42 of the United States Code which provides in 
part that "every person who, under color of any 
statute.. .of any state or territory, subjects or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at  law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings 
for redress."33 
To conclude, what has been the impact of the CD 
cases? At first glance they appear to represent 
overwhelming victories for the government side, 
since virtually every one has been decided in the 
defendant's favor. Nonetheless, plaintiffs' lawyers 
claim that the cases have had a tremendous benefi- 
cial impact on the low and moderate income per- 
sons whom they represent. They emphasize the ex- 
tensive leverage which the ability to bring suit 
gives in overall political bargaining, as well as the 
possibility of settlements advantageous to their po- 
sition. Let me quote again from the "Advocacy 
Guide": "Despite the lack of favorable case prece- 
dent, the cases have had significant favorable im- 
pact. Many cases have resulted in court settle- 
ments which greatly altered local policies and prac- 
tices. Even the judicially unsuccessful cases have 
resulted in local programs being changed in the 
ways sought by plaintiffs. Other cases were 
mooted after the city made the sought after 
changes. Moreover, the symbolic effect of certain 
cases, like Hartford v. Hills, has altered HUD and 
local program behavior. "34 
Whatever one thinks of the effect or desirability 
of this litigation, I am certain that the phenomenon 
is highly upsetting to advocates of the "New Fed- 
eralism. " As you recall, President Nixon's original 
goal in this area was a form of "special revenue 
sharing,'' which would get the federal administra- 
tive agencies completely out of the picture of influ- 
encing local priorities. As I read the CD cases, 
what emerges is not only an enhanced role for the 
agencies, but a dramatic entry of the federal courts 
into the heart of local government law. Regardless 
of one's position on the matter, it is surely an inter- 
esting area of federal grant law a t  work; and I 
think that we shall see more, rather than less, of it 
as the years progress. 
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